I. Administrative Law by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2 Article 7
Spring 3-1-1983
I. Administrative Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
I. Administrative Law, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 471 (1983), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/
wlulr/vol40/iss2/7
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Due Process n Secton 8 Ewctons
Lower income families face a shortage of adequate, affordable
homes.' Congress enacted the Housing and Community Development
Act' to provide lower income families with decent, safe, and sanitary
homes? Section 8 of the Act offers the remedy of rent subsidies to
landlords of lower income families participating in Section 8.' A tenant in
Section 8 housing has a constitutionally protected expectation of con-
tinuing occupancy I Fourteenth amendment due process requirements
1 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976).
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). Sec-
tion 8 housing is subdivided into four separate programs: Section 8 New Construction, Sec-
tion 8 Substantial Rehabilitation, Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation, and Section 8 Existing.
Id., Roisman, Preventing or Ameliorating Displacement m Connection with Section 8, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV 303, 303 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ameliorating Displacement]. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates existing housing programs
through Public Housing Authorities (PHA s). 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (1976). The federal govern-
ment pays rent subsidies through PHA s to private landlords participating voluntarily in
the program. Id. Section 8 landlords and PHA s enter into contracts obligating PHA s to
make supplementary rent payments. Id. § 1437f(b)(1). Landlords then enter into leases with
lower income tenants. Id. § 1437f(c)(3). Lower income families are families whose incomes
are not above 50% of the median family income in the area. Id. § 1437a(2). Under the lease
agreement, the tenant pays a certain percentage of the rent and utilities in proportion to
the tenant's income. Id. § 1437f(c)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 889.105 (1981).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). The policy of Section 8 is to assist PHA s in remedying un-
safe and unsanitary housing conditions and in alleviating the shortage of decent, safe, and
sanitary homes for lower income families. Id. Congress intended Section 8 housing to be the
major program to provide more lower income housing. S. REP No. 94-749, 94th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1885, 1887. Public policy requires
that the government act affirmatively to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons.
Goldberg v Kelly 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970). The national goal of the Housing and Community
Development Act (the Housing Act) is to provide decent homes and a suitable living en-
vironment for every American family 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976); see Holbrooks v. Pitt, 643
F.2d 1261, 1266 (7th Cir. 1981) (HUD provided multi-family housing through HUD-insured
and HUD-held mortgages); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1240 (4th Cir. 1973) (landlord
prevented from evicting without cause a tenant receiving rent subsidy). Other goals of Sec-
tion 8 housing include promoting stability security economic mixing, and social justice. Joy
v Daniels, 479 F.2d at 1240.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976); see supra note 2 (operation of Section 8 Housing programs).
I Jeffries v Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1982); Joy v Daniels,
479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973). Tenants in rent-subsidized housing have an expectation
of occupancy beyond the term of the lease. Goler Metro Apts. Inc. v Williams, 43 N.C. App.
648, 260 S.E. 146, 149 (1979). Although Section 8 leases may be for terms from thirty days to
three years, private landlords only may evict for good cause even after the lease has ex-
pired. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d) (1976); Jeffries v Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d at 925. The
tenants expectation of continued occupancy rises to the level of a property interest that the
fourteeneth amendment due process clause protects. See infra text accompanying notes
81-87 (fourteenth amendment due process protects property interests of Section 8 tenants).
472 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
protect the Section 8 tenant's property interest in occupancy beyond the
terms of the lease.' Eviction procedures should balance the Section 8 ten-
ant's expectation of continuing occupancy with the landlord's
prerogatives as a private owner.'
In Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,' the Supreme Court
discussed whether North Carolina state eviction procedures fulfilled
fourteenth amendment due process requirements for Section 8
a Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1346 (4th Cir. 1982); see infra text ac-
companying notes 81-87. The United States Constitution does not create property interests.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 n.7 (1976). Sources such as statutes, regulations, judicially
formulated rules, and common practice define property interests. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt,
439 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1979) (independent sources such as state law define property interests);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (existing rules or understandings define prop-
erty interests); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (experience and whole do-
main of social and economic facts define property rights); Chavey v. City of Santa Fe Hous.
Auth., 606 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir. 1979) (rules, understandings, independent sources such as
state law create property interests); Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 537-38 (10th Cir.
1979) (mutual expectations, more than abstract need or desire, define property rights).
A citizen's property covers a broad range of interests. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at
601. Property interests extend beyond real estate, chattels or money. Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. For example, the Supreme Court has found that an implied promise of
continued employment to an untenured teacher rose to the level of a property interest. See
Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971) (court proscribed dismissal of publicly
employed teacher who refused to sign loyalty oath). In contrast, the Supreme Court has
held that an untenured professor at a private college had no property interest in continued
employment beyond the one-year employment contract. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
at 578. The Roth Court reasoned that the teacher had only an abstract hope of contract
renewal and no property interest had attached. Id. A mere hope or expectancy is not a con-
stitutionally protected property interest. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 603.
A tenant's interest in remaining in rent-subsidized housing is more than a mere expect-
ancy. McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). A Section 8 tenant has a constitutionally protected property in-
terest in occupancy after expiration of the lease. Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d
1342, 1346 (4th Cir. 1982); see infra text accompanying notes 81-87 (due process protects Sec-
tion 8 tenants' expectation of continued occupancy). The government cannot deprive a per-
son of a property interest without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
' Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 619 (N.D. Ga. 1980), affd, 678
F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982) (Section 8 tenants' property interests outweighed landlord's right
to evict upon thirty-days' notice). In balancing the Section 8 tenant's occupancy expectation
with a private landlord's prerogative to control his property, the factfinder first should con-
sider whether or not the private interest affected is substantial. Id. The second factor that
the factfinder must consider is the risk to the tenant of erroneous deprivation of rights and
privileges. Id. Considerations also should include the probable value of additional or alter-
native procedural safeguards. Id. The final elements are the physical and administrative
burdens affecting the government's interest. Id.; see Note, Procedural Due Process in
Government- Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880, 888-90 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Procedural Due Process] (court first must consider whether interest is within due process,
then must apply balancing test to see if procedure protects interest); infra note 55 (in Sec-
tion 8 eviction cases, courts must consider sufficiency of government involvement); infra
text accompanying notes 88-99 (balancing Section 8 landlords' and tenants' interests).
' 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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evictions." The Thorpe Court held that a Section 8 tenant is entitled to
an explanation of a notice to vacate." Policies behind the Housing and
Community Development Act" and a HUD circular required the Public
Housing Authority (PHA) to hold a private conference with the tenant to
explain the reasons for eviction.2 The tenant then has an opportunity to
reply or to justify his position. 8 The Supreme Court also found that the
PHA has the option to provide a full hearing if the tenant refuses to
vacate voluntarily " If the PHA chooses not to hold a full hearing, the
tenant may challenge the eviction in a state court." The Thorpe Court
implicitly ruled that North Carolina eviction procedures fully protect a
Section 8 tenant's due process rights."6 In Swan v. Gastonsa Housing
Authority, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the PHA must hold a
hearing to determine whether good cause for eviction exists before ap-
proving the termination of a lease. 8 The Swan court also discussed
whether Section 8 tenants have a constitutionally protected expectation
of continued occupancy and whether the eviction of Section 8 tenants
constitutes state action. 9
In Swann, the City of Gastonia, North Carolina acquired the home of
James and Jonell Swann for the use of the City 0 In September 1978, the
Gastonia Housing Authority (GHA) helped the Swanns relocate with a
landlord participating in Section 8 rent-subsidized housing." One year
later the landlord, William Huffstetler, notified the Swanns that he
'Id. at 284.
10 Id. at 272-73 n.8. HUD issued a circular in 1967 stating that the PHA's should inform
Section 8 tenants of the reasons for a proposed eviction. Id. HUD intended that the circular
outline mandatory procedures for the PHA's. Id. at 276. A procedure requiring landlords to
justify their desire to evict through good cause notification furthers the goal of the United
States Housing Act. Id. at 281; see supra note 3 (purposes of Housing Act).
42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976).
' 393 U.S. at 272.
"Id.
1 Id. at 284.
Id.
Id. The Thorpe Court stated that a tenant can challenge effectively the legal suffi-
ciency of the termination proceedings in a North Carolina state court. Id.
" 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
18 Id. at 1343. The Gastonia Housing Authority (GHA) is the PHA that administers the
Section 8 housing program in Gastonia, North Carolina. See supra note 1 (explanation of
Section 8). North Carolina appointed the GHA by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-4 (1982).
10 675 F.2d at 1343.
" Id.
" Id. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act
of 1970 obligated the City of Gastonia to aid the Swanns. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1976, see 675
F.2d at 1343. Section 4625(b) of the Act encourages cooperation between government agen-
cies to help displaced persons relocate. 42 U.S.C. § 4625(b). Section 4625(c)(5) compels the
agency causing relocation to provide information concerning federal housing programs. Id.
§ 4625(c)(5). The City of Gastonia could not displace the Swanns without first assuring them
of suitable relocation housing. Id. § 4626(a); see 675 F.2d at 1343. The City of Gastonia
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would not renew their one-year lease."' Huffstetler gave no explanation
for the notice to vacate.' The plaintiffs believed that the termination of
tenancy was in retaliation for previous Legal Aid assistance the plain-
tiffs sought when Huffstetler brought a prior summary eviction action. 4
The Swanns requested that GHA renew the lease." Alternatively, the
plaintiffs asked for a hearing to prevent termination of the lease without
a finding of good cause."6 The GHA held an informal conference, but
allowed Huffstetler to evict the plaintiffs without a good cause finding.'
The plaintiffs filed a class action against the GHA, a number of GHA
officers, and Huffstetler for improper termination of tenancy 28 The class
assisted the Swanns in acquiring a Certificate of Family Participation necessary for obtain-
ing rent subsidies through the GHA's Section 8 Existing Housing Program. 675 F.2d at
1343.
675 F.2d at 1344.
2 Id.
24 Id. Huffstetler, the landlord, withdrew the first summary eviction action against the
Swanns after he found he had not given adequate notice to vacate. Id. Since Huffstetler pro-
vided no justification for giving Swanns the second notice to vacate, the Swanns concluded
that Huffstetler's reasons were retaliatory. Id. The district court found no evidence to ex-
plain Huffstetler's desire to terminate tenancy. Swam v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F
Supp. 362, 363 (W.D. N.C. 1980), modified, 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982). The Swanns always
had paid their rent and had not violated any conditions of the lease. Id. The Swanns
therefore reasonably believed that Huffstetler's eviction action was in retaliation for their
use of the services of a Legal Aid clinic. 675 F.2d at 1344.
' 675 F.2d at 1344. Section 8 tenants have ten days to object to a landlord's eviction
notice. 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1982). The PHA examines the tenant's objection and the
landlord's grounds for eviction and authorizes the eviction unless the PHA finds the
landlord's grounds for eviction insufficient. Id.
" 675 F.2d at 1344. The termination of tenancy statute covering existing housing gives
the PHA implicit power to review a landlord's request to evict. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)
(1976). In contrast, owners in other Section 8 housing programs, newly constructed or
substantially rehabilitated dwellings, have sole discretion to evict tenants. Id. § 1437f(e)(2).
The owner or landlord, however, may contract for the PHA to assume all responsibility for
evictions. Id. An amended version of section 1437fldM)(B) gives landlords in Section 8 ex-
isting housing the sole power to evict tenants. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 326(e), 95 Stat. 357, 407 (1981) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1323). The
amendment explicitly requires good cause before termination of tenancy. Id. The new ver-
sion of section 1437f(d)(1)(B), however, only applies to leases entered into after the beginning
of fiscal year 1982. Id. Under the amendment, a landlord may not evict except for serious or
repeated violations of the lease, applicable state, local or federal law, or other good cause.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Conference Report to accompany H.R. REP
No. 3982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1010,
1052-53 [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
' 675 F.2d at 1344. In Swann, the informal conference that the GHA held was not a
hearing since the agency did not hear evidence. Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F
Supp. 362, 363 (W.D.N.C. 1980), modified, 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982). The GHA never
gave the Swanns any notice concerning the reasons for termination. Id. at 363-64. The decis-
ion to evict was based on a firm policy of allowing landlords to evict at the end of the lease
term, regardless of cause. 675 F.2d at 1344.
" 675 F.2d at 1344. In Swam, the plaintiff claimed that. the court had jurisdiction
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comprised all present and future participants in the Gastonia Section 8
Existing Housing Program.' On November 22, 1980, the district court
found that the legislative history and the purposes of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 19740 required a good cause finding by
the PHA before eviction." The district court also held that the termina-
tion of tenancy was a state action against Section 8 tenant's property in-
terests and consequently violated plaintiff's fourteenth amendment due
process rights.2 The district court explained that the due process clause
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); 675 F.2d at 1344. Section 1983 gives a cause of action to any
person deprived of a constitutionally secured right, such as a property right. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976); see supra note 4 (Section 8 tenant's constitutionally protected property in-
terest). The Swanns alleged that the actions of the GHA violated § 1437f of the Housing and
Community Development Act and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 675
F.2d at 1344. The district courts have original jurisdiction when a plaintiff alleges that a
state agency has deprived him of a right to a hearing under the due process clause. Caulder
v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1001 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
PHA's are state-created, federally funded and locally administered. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976).
PHA's must operate within constitutional due process limits. See Caulder v. Durham Hous.
Auth., 433 F.2d at 1001 (Section 8 tenants have cause of action for deprivation of hearing
before eviction); Thomas v. Hous. Auth. of Little Rock, 282 F. Supp. 575, 580-81 (E.D. Ark.
1967) (PHA cannot exclude potential tenants from housing programs on basis of illegitimate
children).
' 675 F.2d at 1344. In Swann, the plaintiffs did not have any problem with certification
of the class. Id.; see Holt v. Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397, 400-401 (E.D.
Va. 1966) (PHA cannot condition continued occupancy on a tenant's abandonment of first
amendment rights). Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 675 F.2d at 1344.
0 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). See supra note 3 (legislative history and goals of Housing
Act). HUD must follow stated policies and cannot act in conflict with the legislative history
and purposes of the Housing Act. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1970) (Act's
policies control PHA's obligation to give relocation assistance for residents removed by site
acquisition); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 335 F. Supp. 16, 26 (E.D. Mich. 1971), rev'd, 503
F.2d 1236 (1974) (Act's purposes provide guidelines for substantial safeguards against
negligent and discriminatory practices).
*' Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362, 367 (W.D.N.C. 1980), modified, 675
F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982); see 675 F.2d at 1345. The district court in Swann granted the
Swanns' motion for summary judgment. 502 F. Supp. at 367. The district court in Swann
reasoned that the United States Senate rejected an amendment that would allow landlords
to evict tenants without PHA review. Id. at 364. PHA supervision provides the tenant
substantial protection from an unjustified eviction. S. REP. No. 95-871, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.
5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4473, 4488. The Senate committee felt
that state and municipal laws provided insufficient protection to Section 8 tenants. Id. at 15,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4473. The district court in Swann stated
that the ability of landlords to evict tenants without review frustrated the purposes of the
Housing Act. Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. at 365; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437
(1976). Under Section 8, landlords receive economic security and tenants receive occupancy
security. Id. The federal government should not deprive Section 8 tenants of their stability
by allowing landlords to evict without PHA review. Id.
1 502 F. Supp. at 365; see infra note 40 (North Carolina eviction statutes). The district
court in Swann found a sufficiently close nexus between the state and Section 8 eviction
procedures to constitute state action. 502 F. Supp. at 365; see infra note 55 (courts must find
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requires a good cause determination before eviction.3
On April 8, 1981, the district court entered a final judgment against
the defendants. 4 In addition to reiterating the findings of the necessity
of a good cause finding before eviction and a state action against plain-
tiffs' property interest, the district court held that the required
elements of due process in Section 8 eviction proceedings are adequate
notice of alleged grounds for eviction, a hearing, an impartial decision
maker, a written decision, the right to counsel, the right to call
witnesses, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. 5 The defendants
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 6
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the findings of the district court concern-
ing the necessity of a finding of good cause for eviction, the tenants' con-
stitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy, and termi-
nation of Section 8 tenancy as a state action. The Fourth Circuit,
however, declined to require a formal hearing before eviction." The
Swann court reasoned that North Carolina state eviction proceedings
adequately provide due process to tenants objecting to termination of
tenancy. 9 North Carolina eviction procedures for cause are plenary
judicial hearings requiring landlords to prove the truth of their allega-
sufficient state action before applying fourteenth amendment due process protection). The
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only after a finding of both suf-
ficient state action and a property interest. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1948). If the
plaintiff cannot show sufficient federal or state involvement for fifth or fourteenth amend-
ment due process protection, the court cannot address the deprivation of a property in-
terest. Id. Due process applies only where the state deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see supra note 6 (continued occupancy as property in-
terest); infra note 55 (sufficiency of state action).
' 502 F. Supp. at 367. The district court in Swan loosely defined good cause as good
business reason. Id. Good cause for a Section 8 eviction includes a landlord's good reason to
terminate at the end of the lease, such as his desire to sell the property. Id. A tenant's viola-
tion of a lease condition is another good cause for eviction. Id.
675 F.2d at 1344.
Id. at 1344-45.
Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1343; see infra text accompanying notes 42-58 (Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Swann).
' 675 F.2d at 1343; see infra text accompanying notes 57-64 (Fourth Circuit's discus-
sion of due process requirements for eviction procedures).
675 F.2d at 1346-48; see Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1973). In Joy,
the Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina state eviction procedures require the landlord
to provide notice and proof of good cause. 479 F.2d at 1243. The North Carolina eviction
statutes involved in Swann are indistinguishable from the eviction statutes in Joy. 675 F.2d
at 1347. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-30 (Supp. 1981) (North Carolina eviction statute)
with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-37-20, 27-37-30, 27-37-40 (1976) (South Carolina eviction statutes).
The Swann court stated that the South Carolina procedures in Joy adequately provided
Section 8 tenants with due process. 675 F.2d at 1347.
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tions." North Carolina proceedings also provide a trial by jury.41
In Swan, the Fourth Circuit found a good cause requirement im-
plicit in the language of section 1437f(d)(1)(B) of title 42 of the United
States Code.42 Section 1437f(d)(1)(B) gives a Section 8 owner or landlord
the right to make representations to the PHA concerning eviction.43
Representations include allegations of a tenant's undesirable conduct or
a landlord's desire to remove his property from the Section 8 program.
4
The Swarn court reasoned that such representations would be pointless
if the statute prohibited the PHA from evaluating the sufficiency of good
cause for eviction.45
Swann involved Section 8 Existing Housing."' PHA's implement Sec-
tion 8 Existing Housing through rent subsidies to private owners or
landlords. 7 Section 1437 subdivided Section 8 housing into four separate
programs, including new construction, substantial rehabilitation,
moderate rehabilitation and existing housing. 8 In contrast to Section 8
Existing Housing, other subdivisions of Section 8 housing provide ex-
plicitly that eviction decisions remain solely with the owner or
landlord. 4'9 HUD also outlines eviction procedures in regulations. The
Fourth Circuit recognized and declined to resolve the apparent conflict
between Section 1437f(d)(1)(B) (1976) and section 882.215 of title 24 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.5 Section 1437f(d)(1)(B) and section 882.215
deal with Section 8 Existing Housing.
,0 See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973). North Carolina eviction
statutes require landlords to prove their allegations of good cause for eviction by a
preponderance of the evidence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-30 (Supp. 1981). A landlord initiates
North Carolina eviction proceedings by filing a complaint. Id. § 42-48. The clerk of the
superior court then issues a summons to the Section 8 tenant. Id. A magistrate then decides
at trial whether the landlord's claims have merit. Id. § 42-30.
1 See Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970). On appeal to the
district court, Section 8 tenants facing eviction are entitled to a trial by jury. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-32 (Supp. 1981).
,1 675 F.2d at 1345; see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d}(1)(B) (1976) (implied good cause require-
ment).
,3 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (1976). Contracts between the PHA and the Section 8 owner
or landlord give the landlord the power to give his reasons to the PHA for notifying the ten-
ant of termination of tenancy. Id.
" Id. § 1437f(b)(1) (landlords may terminate in good faith participation in Section 8 pro-
gram); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-46 (1976) (permits summary ejectment for violations of lease
conditions and nonpayment of rent).
'5 675 F.2d at 1345.
Id. at 1343.
'7 See supra note 2 (organization and separation of Section 8 housing).
48 Id.
,1 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (1976). The statute governing eviction procedures for newly
constructed or substantially rehabilitated housing gives all termination of tenancy rights to
owners. Id.
See infra note 51 (regulation governing Section 8 eviction procedures).
" 675 F.2d at 1345 n.2. The statute governing Section 8 evictions provides that the
1983]
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The Fourth Circuit also ruled that fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess procedures apply to Section 8 evictions.2 The Swan court applied a
two-pronged test to determine whether the fourteenth amendment pro-
tects Section 8 tenants. 3 First, the Section 8 tenant must have a property
interest in continued occupancy. Second, the eviction procedure must
constitute state action. The Fourth Circuit found that a tenant in Sec-
PHA's shall have the sole right to give the tenant notice to vacate. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)
(1976). The HUD regulation governing Section 8 evictions states that the owner shall give
the tenant written notice of the proposed eviction. 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1981). The owner
must obtain PHA authorization before eviction under both the statute and regulation. 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (1976); 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1981). Other Section 8 programs provide
explicitly by statute for the owner to have the sole right to terminate tenancy. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(e)(2) (1976); see supra note 49 (newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated
housing). Since Congress has given the PHA power to authorize the eviction, PHA's review
power over the landlords is implicit. Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 922
(11th Cir. 1982).
Administrative rules do not have the force of law. Vandermark v. Hous. Auth. of City
of New York, 663 F.2d 436, 440 (3rd Cir. 1981) (statutory policy of annual contribution con-
tracts to pay past debts to PHA's superseded conflicting regulations). Regulations are not
binding on the public for the purposes of adjudicating rights and obligations. PBW Stock
Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974). Agen-
cies promulgate regulations as general policies to facilitate implementation of government
programs. Id. When an administrative regulation conflicts with a statute, the regulation is a
nullity. See, e.g., Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936)
(treasury regulations that conflict with statutes are invalid); Brown v. Harris, 491 F. Supp.
845, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1980) in conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 1437f). The
general policy behind Section 8 supports PHA intervention to help the poor take full
advantage of housing assistance. See Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 927
(11th Cir. 1982) (Section 8 landlords may evict only for good cause); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d
1236, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1973) (freedom from discrimination under program receiving federal
financial assistance); Brezina v. Dowdall, 472 F. Supp. 82, 85 (W.D. Ill. 1979) (poor and elderly
should be able to take full advantage of housing assistance programs). The Housing and
Community Development Amendments of 1978 support PHA approval before a Section 8
landlord may evict. 42 U.S.C. § 8001 (Supp. 1980).
675 F.2d at 1346.
Id. at 1345-46.
Id.; see supra note 4 (Section 8 tenants have constitutionally protected property in-
terest in continued occupancy).
1 675 F.2d at 1346. A Section 8 tenant must show sufficient federal or state involve-
ment to invoke fifth and fourteenth amendment due process protection against unjustified
eviction. Note, Landlord-Tenant-Due Process-Tenant of Federally Subsidized Housing
May Not Be Evicted Upon Expiration of Lease Absent a Showing of Good Cause, 36 MD. L.
REv. 255, 257 (1976). A court may consider the question of deprivation of liberty or property
by eviction proceedings only after a determination of sufficient government involvement.
Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973). The fourteenth amendment protects per-
sons from deprivation by the government and not from deprivation by private citizens. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. Courts vary in determining the amount of government involvement in
private enterprise sufficient to constitute state action. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974) (actions of privately owned and operated utility com-
pany subject to state regulation not state action for fourteenth amendment purposes);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (state regulation enforced by state
liquor board sufficient state action to allow fourteenth amendment claim against private
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tion 8 housing has a statutory entitlement to continued occupancy.56 The
fourteenth amendment protects a statutory entitlement rising to the
level of a property interest. 7 The Swann court also ruled that govern-
ment subsidies and regulation constitute sufficient government involve-
ment for state action.'
Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that North Carolina eviction pro-
ceedings adequately provided any constitutionally required due
process. 9 The Swann court further stated that a Section 8 landlord
never can avail himself of a summary end-of-term eviction proceeding in
state court." Only eviction proceedings brought for cause provide ade-
quate due process. 1 The Fourth Circuit's ruling, however, does not pro-
hibit a full hearing before a PHA.62 If an impartial decisionmaker con-
ducts a PHA hearing, allows counsel for both landlord and tenant,
club). See generally Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions
to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974).
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
sufficient government involvement in private enterprise to constitute state action. 365 U.S.
715, 725 (1961). In Burton, a publicly owned parking authority leased space to the racially
discriminatory owners of a coffee shop. Id. at 716. The Burton Court held that public owner-
ship made the state a joint participant in the discriminatory activity. Id. at 725. The
Supreme Court in Burton ruled that the fourteenth amendment applied to prohibit
discriminatory activity since the coffee shop was no longer a purely private enterprise. Id.
The fourteenth amendment proscription against deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law does not regulate the actions of private individuals involved in
private activities. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 345. Government regula-
tion alone is not sufficient to constitute state action. Id. at 350. PHA's have the authority to
screen tenants, renew and review leases, authorize evictions, direct contract relations, in-
form landlords and tenants of rights and responsibilities, oversee HUD housing standards,
and inspect for proper property maintenance. See generally 42 U.S.C. 1437f(b)(1),
1437f(d)(1)(A-D) (1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.109, 882.116(a), 882.116(c), 882.116(j), 
8 8 2 .11 6 (p)
(1981). The Section 8 landlord receives the benefits of a secure contractual relationship with
the government, reimbursement for unpaid rent and sixty days rent if the tenant vacates
before the end of the lease term. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.105(b),
882.112(d) (1981). The PHA's authority combined with the Section 8 landlord's receipt of
government protection constitute sufficient government involvement for a finding that Sec-
tion 8 eviction procedures are state action for fourteenth amendment due process purposes.
Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d at 1346.
675 F.2d at 1346.
5 See supra note 6 (Section 8 tenant's constitutionally protected property interest).
675 F.2d at 1346; see supra note 54 (Section 8 eviction procedures have sufficient
government involvement to constitute state action).
" 675 F.2d at 1347. The Swann court concluded that North Carolina eviction pro-
cedures fulfill due process requirements if the Section 8 landlord must prove good cause. Id.
Expiration of the lease alone is insufficient cause to evict a Section 8 tenant. Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348. The Swann court found that due process does not require a PHA hearing
before a Section 8 landlord brings an eviction action in state court. Id. The Fourth Circuit
did not prohibit a hearing before the PHA, but implied that state eviction proceedings
satisfied due process requirements. Id.
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provides the right to call and cross-examine witnesses, and requires ade-
quate notice of alleged grounds for eviction, state eviction proceedings
might not be necessary." The Swann court found simply that state court
eviction proceedings provide a Section 8 tenant with all the due process
that the Constitution requires."
Although Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham5 and its progeny
have supplied the framework within which courts must exercise their
discretion, the Supreme Court has not delineated clearly the due process
requirements for eviction procedures.6 Consequently, federal circuit
court decisions regarding due process standards for evictions have yielded
diverse results."7 Some courts require the PHA to hold an adversarial
hearing complete with notice of good cause to the tenant, an opportunity
for a hearing, and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses." The Fourth Circuit deems state eviction procedures suf-
ficient without a prior administrative hearing. A few courts have found
" Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1970). The Caulder
court applied the due process requirements that the Supreme Court defined in Goldberg v.
Kelly. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d at 1003-1004. In
Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing before
the termination of government benefits such as welfare. 397 U.S. at 260. The evidentiary
hearing must provide adequate notice of the reasons for the proposed termination and an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. at 267-68. Section 8
tenants are entitled under Goldberg to due process protection before eviction. Escalera v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1970).
675 F.2d at 1348.
393 U.S. 268 (1969).
Id. at 284.
67 Id.; see infra notes 78 & 82 (circuits are divided on sufficiency of government in-
volvement constituting state action).
See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973) (due process before evic-
tion from federal housing program requires notice, confrontation of witnesses, counsel, and
impartial decisionmaker); Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (tenant in federally subsidized low-rent housing project en-
titled to notice, confrontation of witnesses, counsel, and impartial decisionmaker before
eviction). Notice and a hearing before eviction are necessary if the tenant has a constitu-
tionally protected interest in continued occupancy. Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
603 (1972) (no constitutionally protected expectancy in continued employment for untenured
professor); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (constitutionally protected expecta-
tion of continued receipt of welfare benefits). Classic adjudicative facts or facts that are
most susceptible to differences of opinion, such as opinions on behavior and credibility, are
involved in decisions to evict. Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 620 (N.D.
Ga. 1980), affd, 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982); Procedural Due Process, supra note 7, at 906.
An adversarial hearing is the most suitable means to reconcile classic adjudicative facts. 503
F. Supp. at 620; Procedural Due Process, supra note 7, at 906. An evidentiary hearing par-
ticularly necessary where a motive for malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy exists. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
'9 See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342, 1348 (4th Cir. 1982) (state
eviction proceedings provide due process and the Constitution does not require ad-
ministrative hearing); Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970) (hearing un-
necessary since Section 8 tenant can challenge eviction in state court); Jeffries v. Georgia
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that a Section 8 tenant has the benefit of due process before eviction
without good cause notice and a full hearing."0 The confused state of the
law has undermined the purpose of rent-subsidized housing. 1 Without
uniform protection against arbitrary and retaliatory evictions, lower in-
come tenants are deprived unjustly of government benefits. 7
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Swann departs from the analyses
of several other circuits."3 The majority of circuits have determined that
the threshold question is whether fourteenth amendment due process
applies to protect the individual.74 The first element in due process ap-
Res. Fin. Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 620 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (requiring hearings by PHA's unduly
burden agencies financially), affd, 678 F.2d 919 (4th Ci. 1982).
"' See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1285 (7th Cir. 1981) (due process requires
written statement of reasons for denial of benefits and opportunity to challenge reasons);
Bonner v. Park Lake Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 330, 333 N.Y.S.2d 277, 282
(1972) (full hearing unnecessary before termination of benefits). Due process is a flexible con-
cept, adaptable to fit the needs of the particular situation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972). One function of fifth and fourteenth amendment due process is to minimize
the risk of erroneous decisions. Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d at 1280. Eviction procedures,
therefore, must adapt to the demands of each case. See Greenholz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (parole procedures adapted to individual
prisoners); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (adaptable procedures for social
security benefit termination). Due process may not require an administrative hearing prior
to eviction if the section 8 tenant receives a plenary hearing before the PHA before term-
ination of tenancy. See supra text accompanying notes 68 & 69 (due process requirements
for administrative hearing).
7' See supra note 3 (purposes of Housing Act).
r See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972) (consistent application of due pro-
cess protects against arbitrary encroachment on property interest). Due process protects
against arbitrary and erroneous deprivation of property. Id. Justice demands that the
government consider the magnitude of the citizen's interest before discontinuing benefits.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 173 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). A purely private landlord cannot evict in retaliation if a tenant reports housing
code violations. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (disallowed eviction
prompted by retaliatory motives), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); N.C. GEM. STAT.
§ 42-37.2(a) (Supp. 1981) (prohibition against retaliatory evictions). The defendant in an evic-
tion proceeding may raise the landlord's retaliatory motive as an affirmative defense. Id.
§ 42-37.1(b). Courts have inferred a retaliatory motive to evict from the circumstances of the
particular situation. See, e.g., McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (landlord
did not deny retaliatory motive); Holt v. Richmond Redev. and Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp.
397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1966) (tenant's activities as president of tenants' rights organization
evidence of retaliatory motive to evict). See generally Bush, Retaliatory Eviction: A Na-
tional Perspective, 8 LAW AND Hous. J. 26, 26-55 (1980); Procedural Due Process, supra note
7, at 891-92; Note, Landlord and Tenant-Prohibition of Retaliatory Eviction In Landlord-
Tenant Relations: A Study of Practice and Proposals, 54 N.C. L. Rav. 861, 861-64 (1976).
" See infra text accompanying notes 74-76 (courts first should address the issue of
state action, then property interest to determine fourteenth amendment application).
71 See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 1982)
(participation in PHA termination and eviction procedures constitutes state action);
Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 (7th Cir. 1981) (Section 8 housing contract between
landlord and PHA sufficient government involvement); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556
F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1977) (nonjudicial foreclosure of HUD-assisted mortgage entailed no
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plication is the existence of sufficient government involvement to con-
stitute state action."5 The second due process element is whether the ten-
ant has an expectation of continued occupancy that rises to the level of a
constitutionally protected property interest.5
In deciding Swan, the Fourth Circuit adopted the First and
Eleventh Circuits' measure of government involvement sufficient for a
finding of state action.77 In contrast to the First and Eleventh Circuits,
the Second and Eighth Circuits have required a greater degree of
governmental funding, regulation, and oversight before classifying evic-
tion procedures as state actions." If the factfinder discovers insufficient
state action, the fourteenth amendment cannot apply. 9 Fourteenth
amendment due process protects persons only against deprivations by
the government, not by private individuals.0
Once a court holds that fourteenth amendment due process protec-
tion applies to the state action, the court must find deprivation of a con-
stitutionally protected interest."' In Swann, the Fourth Circuit followed
the trend toward finding that government benefits, such as rent-
subsidized housing, become property interests for purposes of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.82 As a government agency, a PHA cannot
federal action); Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1973)
(50% tax break on federal mortgage held insufficient state action for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)
claim); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781, 784 (1st Cir. 1971) (government mortgage in-
surance sufficient to constitute state action); McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d
1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (federal mortgage insurance insufficient for fourteenth
amendment due process protection), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
" Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 1982); see supra notes
32 & 44 (Section 8 tenant first must show sufficient government involvement for a finding of
state action before fourteenth amendment due process applies.
" Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 1982); see supra
notes 5 & 6 (constitutionally protected property interest in occupancy after expiration of
lease).
" Id at 1346; see Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 923-25 (11th Cir.
1982) (Section 8 housing participation equals sufficient government involvement); McQueen
v. Drucker, 438 F.2d 781, 783 (1st Cir. 1971) (regulation of federal loan insurance constitutes
sufficient state action for mortgage).
78 See, e.g., Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1973) (50%
property tax break and attendant regulations insufficient government involvement);
McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (federal in-
surance for mortgage insufficient involvement to prevent eviction without cause), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
79 See supra note 55 (application of fourteenth amendment after finding of sufficient
government involvement).
'o U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see supra note 32 (fourteenth amendment protection from
government deprivations).
11 Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973); see supra text accompanying
notes 73-76 (courts must consider state action and property interests).
2 675 F.2d at 1346-48; see supra note 6 (government benefits as constitutionally pro-
tected property interests). Due process protects property interests such as welfare benefits.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970). A Section 8 tenant's right to permanence in
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deprive a Section 8 tenant of his property interest in continued occupancy
without due process.' The Swann court protected the rights of Section 8
tenants by holding that unjustified evictions infringe upon fourteenth
amendment property rights. 4 Although section 1437f leases require 30
days notice before termination, the leases are renewable automatically."
The automatic renewal feature justifies the tenant's expectation of con-
tinuing occupancy.86 The Section 8 tenant's expectation of continued oc-
cupancy at the end of the lease rises to the level of a property interest
protected by fourteenth amendment due processI
T
In making a property interest determination, courts must balance
the landlord's interests as a private owner with the impoverished Sec-
tion 8 tenant's need for stability and security.' Section 8 landlords aid
subsidized housing is no less a property interest than a welfare recipient's right to con-
tinued benefits until a due process proceedings terminates those benefits. Joy v. Daniels,
479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973).
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court determined that procedural due process applies when
a welfare recipient suffers loss of his property interest in continued benefits. 397 U.S. at
262-63; see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (due process safeguards apply where government employees
suffer loss when Attorney General places their names on disloyalty list). A welfare recipient
left destitute is entitled to a hearing that complies with due process before termination of
benefits. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 898-900 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). Similarly, Section 8
tenants living at subsistence levels have a substantial interest in continued occupancy. See
Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1970) (occupancy in rent sub-
sidized housing entitled to same due process protection as continued welfare benefits), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 619 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (welfare benefits and rent subsidies require equivalent due process protection),
affd, 678 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1982); supra notes 5 & 6 (tenants' expectation of continued oc-
cupancy protected by due process).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment prohibits the taking of prop-
erty under color of state law without due process of law. Id. PHA's are state agencies and
must operate within fourteenth amendment due process requirements. See supra note 2
(formation and regulation of PHA's); supra note 18 (GHA in Swann is a state appointed
agency).
675 F.2d at 1347.
Id at 1344. The lease in Swann was a PHA standard form lease providing for
automatic renewal at the end of the term unless the GHA or the landlord instituted a ter-
mination procedure. Id.
Id. A purely private landlord-tenant relationship permits the landlord to bring sum-
mary ejectment proceedings. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-46 (1976). The landlord can evict the te-
nant at any time after the expiration of the lease, with or without cause. Id. The automatic
renewal provision in Section 8 leases prevents the landlord from initating the North
Carolina procedure to evict a holdover tenant without cause. 675 F.2d at 1344; see supra
note 5 (automatic renewal provisions give expectation of continued occupancy).
" See supra note 6 (continued occupancy is constitutionally protected property in-
terest).
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (welfare recipient's right to continued
benefits balances the demand on public tax revenues); Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675
F.2d 1342, 1346 (4th Cir. 1982) (Section 8 tenant's interest in due process before eviction
balances landlord's interest in managing his private property). Eviction procedures often
are swift and inexorable. Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Ap-
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the government by providing property to help solve the national prob-
lem of inadequate housing. 9 One purpose of Section 8 housing is to in-
tegrate lower income families into neighborhoods with self-sufficient
families. Integration furthers the policy of the Housing and Community
Development Act by creating an economic, racial, age, ethnic, and
religious mix in the community." An economic mix prevents concentra-
tions of low-income families that often produce an unsafe and
undesirable environment.9 Most landlords, therefore, feel that a tenant
in a rent subsidy program should have the same expectations and obliga-
tions as a nonsubsidized tenant. 3 Private tenants do not have a constitu-
tionally protected property interest in continued occupancy following
the end of the lease term. 4
Just as Section 8 tenants are not purely private tenants, Section 8
landlords are not acting as totally private entrepreneurs.9 Section 8
landlords voluntarily subject themselves to regulations concerning con-
tract terms, lease terms, and housing standards. 6 The PHA may exer-
cise continuous supervision of the Section 8 landlord. In return for the
inconvenience of government interference, landlords receive significant
rent security normally not available from private tenants. The Section
praisal, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 207, 222 (1970). The tenant facing eviction
needs time to prepare defenses and counterclaims. Id. The poor have not always received
adequate protection for their Section 8 rent subsidy entitlements. Neich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965). Due pro-
cess should prevent the unjustified or arbitrary uprooting of tenants who are without per-
sonal funds or assets. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 261.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). United States policy is to remedy the acute shortage of de-
cent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for low income families. Id. Congress formulated Section 8
housing assistance programs to assist the states in alleviating unsafe and unsanitary hous-
ing conditions. Id. North Carolina recognized the state's own housing problem and authorized
PHA's to implement Section 8 housing as a remedy. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-2 (1976).
'o Conference Report, supra note 26, at 695; see supra note 3 (goals and purposes of the
Housing and Community Development Act).
9 Conference Report, supra note 26, at 685.
92 Id
"' Brief for Appellant at 4, Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (11th Cir.
1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. A family seeking Section 8 existing housing
in the private sector should not expect greater due process protection than that afforded
families receiving no rent subsidies. Id.
", See supra note 86 (landlords normally may evict holdover tenants with or without
cause).
" See supra note 55 (landlord's involvement in Section 8 housing constitutes state ac-
tion).
See id. (PHA regulatory powers over Section 8 landlords).
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(b)(1), 1437f(d)(1)(A-D) (1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.109,
882.116(a), 882.116(c), 882.116(j), 882.116(p) (1981).
Jeffries v. Georgia Res. Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 923-24 (11th Cir. 1982); Swann v.




8 tenant also should receive some additional security in the form of a
constitutionally protected expectation of occupancy.9
In Swann, the Fourth Circuit determined that state eviction pro-
cedures adequately protected the Swann's expectation of continuous oc-
cupancy.' Section 8 landlords, however, only may institute eviction pro-
ceedings for cause and not for summary end-of-term evictions.'0 ' Proof of
lease expiration alone is insufficient to evict a tenant receiving rent sub-
sidies." 2 Since state eviction procedures require landlords to prove the
truth of their allegations of tenant misconduct, state procedures best
protect the Section 8 tenant's rights.' North Carolina state eviction pro-
cedures are adversarial.'0 4 The eviction trials include the right to a jury,
the right to counsel, the right to be heard, and the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses. 0'
State eviction procedures, however, are not ideal. Public hearings do
not preserve the anonymity of reluctant witnesses who fear possible
retaliatory evictions.' If the circumstances warranted, however, the
parties could seek a summary administrative hearing before the PHA
prior to trial." An administrative proceeding would protect the privacy
" See supra notes 5 & 6 (continuous occupancy a constitutionally protected interest for
Section 8 tenants).
"1 675 F.2d at 1348.
101 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 37-41 (adequacy of North Carolina eviction
for cause procedures).
10 See supra text accompanying notes 59-64 (due process requirements for eviction pro-
cedures).
"0 Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d at 1347-48; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-30
(Supp. 1981) (North Carolina eviction statute).
104 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-30, 42-32 (Supp. 1981); see Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236,
1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973) (eviction procedures are plenary judicial hearings); supra text accom-
panying notes 38-41 (adversarial nature of state eviction proceedings for cause).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-30, 42-32, 42-48 (Supp. 1981); see supra note 40 (components of
North Carolina eviction procedures).
1" See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972) (parole hearings do not protect
anonymity).
" See Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003-1004 (4th Cir. 1970). In
Caulder, the Fourth Circuit recognized the possible need for summary adjudication in Sec-
tion 8 evictions. Id. A summary action pending a later hearing is proper when the private in-
terest affected is less important than the threatened harm to other tenants or to the general
public. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961) (summary dismissal
of worker on military vessel upheld because the federal government has unchecked control
in its military capacity); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselbury, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-601 (1950)
(public danger justified seizure of mislabeled vitamins); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 429-430 (1944) (overriding public interest justified wartime price regulations); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320 (1908) (unhealthy food recalled);
Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (government disqualified contractor);
R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir.) (suspension of exemption from stock
registration requirement), cert denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962). In Section 8 eviction cases, sum-
mary action could take the form of an injunction, an informal hearing or another ad-
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rights of other tenants."'8 Traditional adjudication is burdened with ex-
pense and delay."9 Families receiving rent subsidies, as well as struggl-
ing landlords, cannot afford lengthy litigation. Trials demand time and
personnel. Frequent PHA involvement in litigation might hamper the
utility of Section 8 housing programs.10 Additionally, public proceedings
often stigmatize the losing party.' An administrative hearing
theoretically would protect landlords, tenants, and witnesses. 1 '
Congress amended section 1437f(d)(1)(B) to govern eviction pro-
ceedings for leases entered into on or after October 1, 1981.113 The
amendment explicitly requires a good cause finding by state courts and
eliminates agency involvement in Section 8 evictions." Nevertheless,
the Swann decision will have several ramifications within the Fourth
Circuit. First, Section 8 landlords must establish good cause before termi-
nation of tenancy regardless of lease provisions."' Second, the Swann
court decreased the possibility of an administrative resolution to evic-
tion disputes by circumventing an administrative hearing in favor of
state proceedings."' Finally, the Section 8 program might suffer because
landlords will hesitate to relinquish the prerogative for nonrenewal."7
The decision in Swann v. Gastonia Housing Authority furthered the
goal of safe, sanitary housing for all families."' Landlords are enjoined
from instituting arbitrary and retaliatory eviction proceedings against
ministrative remedy. The remedy should fit the unique situation considering the problems
of anonymity, expense and public endangerment. See supra text accompanying note 106,
and infra text accompanying notes 108-112 (problems with state eviction procedures).
1 Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003-1004 (4th Cir. 1970).
lo See Procedural Due Process, supra note 7, at 9007 (litigation is expensive and often
delayed).
Id. (problems with resolution through litigation).
Ill Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). The Roth Court would require
notice and a hearing as due process protection when a removal would endanger standing
and connection in the community. Id. Procedural protection may be applicable for threatened
damage to good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (denial of right to purchase intoxicating beverages); Peters v. Hobby,
349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955) (Douglas, J., concuriing) (ineligibility for government employment);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-92 (1952) (exclusion from public employment);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1946) (proscription from government service
for subversive activity).
Il2 See Bonner v. Park Lake Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 330, 333 N.Y.S.2d
277, 282 (1972) (administrative hearings protect participants).
Il Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 326(e), 95 Stat. 357,
407 (1981) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1323).
114 Id.
Il' See supra text accompanying notes 37, 42-45, 38-41 (Swann Court required a good
cause determination before eviction).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 38-41, 59-64 (Swann court found state eviction
procedures fulfilled due cause requirements).
117 Brief for Appellant, supra note 93, at 7 (landlords will hesitate to participate in Sec-
tion 8 if they cannot evict without cause).
Ill See supra note 3 (goals of the Housing and Community Development Act).
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